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A few brief observations in conclusion. While Mr. Garlan
proclaims his allegiance to the "phi'osophical school" of legal
realism, he pursues his course without raising any philosophically
controversial issues. His study is thus unaffected by any special
theories of law. To the philosopher this is a merit of the study.
In the rereading of Mr. Garlan's pages the reviewer was struck
by the frequency of the term "elastic." It would be easy to gain
the impression that his work is dynaimitic of traditional legal procedures. However, in his chapter The. Unity of Justice, he
attempts, not wholly satisfactorily, to soft-pedal his negative
analysis. He is more successful in this than in his discussion of the
"problematic" and the "indeterminate in justice" where he finds that
legal formalism provides within itself for elasticity both in the inherent vagueness of the rules as applied to concrete cases whether by
judge or lawyer, and by the inclusion of "general formulae." His
point of view may fairly be summed up in the quoted words of
Vinogradoff that "law, being a human institution, ages not only in
its single rules and doctrines, but in its national and historic setting,
and the call for purification and reform may become more and more
pressing with every generation" (p. 71). For Mr. Garlan the legal
process is a phenomenon whose history exhibits what may be'
called an elastic stability. From the philosophic standpoint the
formal structure of law and its social phenomena are not in themselves subject to ethical criteria and criticism, but specific structures
in and through which the ethical may be realized.
HERBERT MARTIN*

CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (National Casebook Series).

By Frank E. Horack, Jr.t Chicago: Callaghan and Company.
1940. Pp. xxix, 829. $7.00.
The Formulation of Legislative Policy, the first chapter in Professor Horack's casebook, is one hundred seventy-one pages in
length, is divided into five paragraphs, and there is much subdivision. If I were to use this casebook,. I would eliminate this
chapter entirely, unless perhaps the students were a first-year class.
Some of the material is interesting encugh for casual perusal, but
a large part of it was dreary reading to this writer. The court decisions contained in this chapter are simple cases in criminal law,
torts, contracts, equity, and constitutional law. They would be of
interest to first-year law students, but otherwise would probably
constitute the threshing of old straw. There is difficulty in reconciling the author's belief, expressed in the preface, that Chapter I is
* Retired Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa.
'- Professor of Law, University of Indiana.
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important with this later statement: "By far the largest bulk of
scientific legislative writing concerns the question of legislative
mechanics, that is, of procedure, statutory interpretation, and drafting. There has been a significant silence concerning means and
technique [if any exists] by which a legislature decides what legislation it wishes and the character, scope, and limits of its policy."
Observe also this quotation from T. V. Smith, "only a philosopher
and an ignorant man:" "The legislator knows whereof he speaks,
when he says that legislation based upon scientific knowledge is
mostly myth." But the author apparently believes that legislation
has its common law and that, "The development of legislative policy
follows as predictable a system as does the judicial opinion."
Chapter II is concerned with Legislative Organization and Procedure and is primarily informational in character. Much, if not
most, of it is not court decisions but excerpts from statutes, constitutions, legislative rules, the Congressional Record, and a variety
of comments. A reading of it will give a student an acquaintance
with, but not a complete picture of, legislative procedure, since it
is believed that no chapter of less than one hundred fifty pages
can accomplish that much. My chief doubt about this chapter is
as to its usefulness as a teaching tool. As a basis for some question
to ascertain whether one's students have absorbed the information,
or as a basis for a few lectures on the technical legislative process
in the enactment of statutes, Chapter II would be useful. But where
are the problems for solution? Where is the tough material that
produces mental discipline? I failed to find much of it even though
there are some twenty-two court opinions in the chapter. The best
of them, from the viewpoint just stated, are three concerning the
finality of the enrolled bill filed by the Secretary of State, i. e.,
McGrain v. Dougherty, The Pocket Veto Case,' and Edwards v.

United States.' Some of these are not unknown to casebooks on
constitutional law.
Among other words, the following are found in Section thirteen
of article four of the Illinois Constitution:

"... and no law shall be

revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the
new act." Other state constitutions have similar provisions. If one
wishes to have his students study cases that present difficult and
confused problems on this phase of the legislative technique, all he
has to do is to copy a number of the Illinois opinions interpreting
this provision, and some from other states construing similar provisions. By that time the students will have recognized that there
1273 U. S. 135 (1927).

Okanogan Indians v. United States, 279 U. S. 655 (1929).

S286 U. S.482 (1932).
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are tough though narrow problems in this part of constitutional
law that are usually placed in the course entitled "Legislation" or
"Statutes." It seems strange that these cases apparently have been
ignored by Professor Horack. They might well have been placed
in a later chapter.
The author's treatment of Influencing Legislative Action contains sixty-six pages of interesting reading. But what can be done
with it in class? It is simple materiat that requires no more effort
to understand than the reading of The New York Times. In fact,
for a student who has been consistently interested in current events,
being quizzed about or lectured to concerning pressure groups and
lobbying seems hardly necessary. Of the five cases reported in
this chapter, Lochner v. New York' is more appropriate for the
course in Constitutional Law. On page 366 there is a quotation
from Holmes. There is no citation, but apparently it was the
author's intention to quote part of the dissenting opinion by Holmes
in Abrams v. United States." Unfortunately, the quotation is badly
garbled with a consequent injustice to Holmes' memory.
Chiefly informational and illustrative is the next chapter on
Types of Statutes. The comment on p:ge 384 to 387, inclusive, and
particularly note 8 would appear fo be more complete if it had included the principle involved in such cases as Stewart v. Kansas
City and Trenton v. New Jersey.' There are a number of court
opinions dealing with problems of constitutional law, but apparently
these are to be used primarily for illustrative purposes. The material on resolutions seems to be good, although perhaps it should
have been developed more extensively.
It seems safe to state that Chapters V and VI constitute the best
part of the book. The material is adequate to present the problems
of interpretation and those confronting the bill drafter. I should be
tempted to start teaching with one of these chapters. If I had time
left, I would know the students could benefit themselves by drafting
statutes. Professor Horack could have assisted in this by copying
samples of poorly drafted legislation. The students could then make
these samples into model legislation. However, an instructor can
have such samples mimeographed for his classes.
Part 1I of Horack's work should he a good casebook for advanced law students, although I am skeptical about this part for
beginners. Part I of this casebook is, in my opinion, of doubtful
value, certainly for students beyond the first year.
KENNETH C. SEARS*
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